xeenon

WebCore contributor

26 commits (10mo)
5 security fixes
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Summary

xeenon works almost exclusively on the Web Extensions surface of the WebKit API layer — WKWebExtensionController configuration and datastore lifecycle, content-script/background message passing, cookies and declarativeNetRequest — with a secondary line in text extraction and WKWebView snapshot APIs. The security fixes land in that same area rather than in the engine: a use-after-free in `_WKWebExtensionDeclarativeNetRequestRule` resource resolution and a `safari-web-extension` URL masking bypass, plus cherry-picked rdar-tracked fixes; nothing in the window is classified as hardening. Systematic-variant candidate: the extension-to-page trust boundary. URL masking, user-gesture propagation through `sendMessage()`/`connect()`/`postMessage()`/`executeScript()`, non-persistent datastore defaults, and popup WKWebView teardown are all commits against the same boundary, and the object-lifetime bugs (popup views not released, flaky teardown assertions) sit next to the one UAF already found there.

Components

WebKit
57%
Platform
20%
WebCore
17%
WTF
3%
JSC
3%

Security Fix History

Hardening Commits

Recent Commits

1 / 2

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